Monday, January 14, 2008

we own the world

by noam chomsky, january 1, 2008, found here and adapted from a z media institute talk, june 2007.

You all know, of course, there was an election -- what is called "an election" in the United States -- last November. There was really one issue in the election, what to do about U.S. forces in Iraq and there was, by U.S. standards, an overwhelming vote calling for a withdrawal of U.S. forces on a firm timetable.

As few people know, a couple of months earlier there were extensive polls in Iraq, U.S.-run polls, with interesting results. They were not secret here. If you really looked you could find references to them, so it's not that they were concealed. This poll found that two-thirds of the people in Baghdad wanted the U.S. troops out immediately; the rest of the country -- a large majority -- wanted a firm timetable for withdrawal, most of them within a year or less.

The figures are higher for Arab Iraq in the areas where troops were actually deployed. A very large majority felt that the presence of U.S. forces increased the level of violence and a remarkable 60 percent for all of Iraq, meaning higher in the areas where the troops are deployed, felt that U.S. forces were legitimate targets of attack. So there was a considerable consensus between Iraqis and Americans on what should be done in Iraq, namely troops should be withdrawn either immediately or with a firm timetable.

Well, the reaction in the post-election U.S. government to that consensus was to violate public opinion and increase the troop presence by maybe 30,000 to 50,000. Predictably, there was a pretext announced. It was pretty obvious what it was going to be. "There is outside interference in Iraq, which we have to defend the Iraqis against. The Iranians are interfering in Iraq." Then came the alleged evidence about finding IEDs, roadside bombs with Iranian markings, as well as Iranian forces in Iraq. "What can we do? We have to escalate to defend Iraq from the outside intervention."

Then came the "debate." We are a free and open society, after all, so we have "lively" debates. On the one side were the hawks who said, "The Iranians are interfering, we have to bomb them." On the other side were the doves who said, "We cannot be sure the evidence is correct, maybe you misread the serial numbers or maybe it is just the revolutionary guards and not the government."

So we had the usual kind of debate going on, which illustrates a very important and pervasive distinction between several types of propaganda systems. To take the ideal types, exaggerating a little: totalitarian states' propaganda is that you better accept it, or else. And "or else" can be of various consequences, depending on the nature of the state. People can actually believe whatever they want as long as they obey. Democratic societies use a different method: they don't articulate the party line. That's a mistake. What they do is presuppose it, then encourage vigorous debate within the framework of the party line. This serves two purposes. For one thing it gives the impression of a free and open society because, after all, we have lively debate. It also instills a propaganda line that becomes something you presuppose, like the air you breathe.

That was the case here. This is a classic illustration. The whole debate about the Iranian "interference" in Iraq makes sense only on one assumption, namely, that "we own the world." If we own the world, then the only question that can arise is that someone else is interfering in a country we have invaded and occupied.

So if you look over the debate that took place and is still taking place about Iranian interference, no one points out this is insane. How can Iran be interfering in a country that we invaded and occupied? It's only appropriate on the presupposition that we own the world. Once you have that established in your head, the discussion is perfectly sensible.

You read a lot of comparisons now about Vietnam and Iraq. For the most part they are totally incomparable; the nature and purpose of the war, almost everything is totally different except in one respect: how they are perceived in the United States. In both cases there is what is now sometimes called the "Q" word, quagmire. Is it a quagmire? In Vietnam it is now recognized that it was a quagmire. There is a debate of whether Iraq, too, is a quagmire. In other words, is it costing us too much? That is the question you can debate.

So in the case of Vietnam, there was a debate. Not at the beginning -- in fact, there was so little discussion in the beginning that nobody even remembers when the war began -- 1962, if you're interested. That's when the U.S. attacked Vietnam. But there was no discussion, no debate, nothing.

By the mid-1960s, mainstream debate began. And it was the usual range of opinions between the hawks and the doves. The hawks said if we send more troops, we can win. The doves, well, Arthur Schlesinger, famous historian, Kennedy's advisor, in his book in 1966 said that we all pray that the hawks will be right and that the current escalation of troops, which by then was approaching half a million, will work and bring us victory. If it does, we will all be praising the wisdom and statesmanship of the American government for winning victory -- in a land that we're reducing to ruin and wreck.

You can translate that word by word to the doves today. We all pray that the surge will work. If it does, contrary to our expectations, we will be praising the wisdom and statesmanship of the Bush administration in a country, which, if we're honest, is a total ruin, one of the worst disasters in military history for the population.

If you get way to the left end of mainstream discussion, you get somebody like Anthony Lewis who, at the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, wrote in retrospect that the war began with benign intensions to do good; that is true by definition, because it's us, after all. So it began with benign intentions, but by 1969, he said, it was clear that the war was a mistake. For us to win a victory would be too costly -- for us -- so it was a mistake and we should withdraw. That was the most extreme criticism.

Very much like today. We could withdraw from Vietnam because the U.S. had already essentially obtained its objective by then. Iraq we can't because we haven't obtained our objectives.

And for those of you who are old enough to remember -- or have read about it -- you will note that the peace movement pretty much bought that line. Just like the mainstream discussion, the opposition of the war, including the peace movement, was mostly focused on the bombing of the North. When the U.S. started bombing the North regularly in February 1965, it also escalated the bombing of the South to triple the scale -- and the South had already been attacked for three years by then. A couple of hundred thousand South Vietnamese were killed and thousands, if not tens of the thousands, had been driven into concentration camps. The U.S. had been carrying out chemical warfare to destroy food crops and ground cover. By 1965 South Vietnam was already a total wreck.

Bombing the South was costless for the United States because the South had no defense. Bombing the North was costly -- you bomb the North, you bomb the harbor, you might hit Russian ships, which begins to become dangerous. You're bombing an internal Chinese railroad -- the Chinese railroads from southeast to southwest China happen to go through North Vietnam -- who knows what they might do.

In fact, the Chinese were accused, correctly, of sending Chinese forces into Vietnam, namely to rebuild the railroad that we were bombing. So that was "interference" with our divine right to bomb North Vietnam. So most of the focus was on the bombing of the North. The peace movement slogan, "Stop the bombing" meant the bombing of the North.

In 1967 the leading specialist on Vietnam, Bernard Fall, a military historian and the only specialist on Vietnam respected by the U.S. government -- who was a hawk, incidentally, but who cared about the Vietnamese -- wrote that it's a question of whether Vietnam will survive as a cultural and historical entity under the most severe bombing that has ever been applied to a country this size. He was talking about the South. He kept emphasizing it was the South that was being attacked. But that didn't matter because it was costless, therefore it's fine to continue. That is the range of debate, which only makes sense on the assumption that we own the world.

If you read, say, the Pentagon Papers, it turns out there was extensive planning about the bombing of the North -- very detailed, meticulous planning on just how far it can go, what happens if we go a little too far, and so on. There is no discussion at all about the bombing of the South, virtually none. Just an occasional announcement, okay, we will triple the bombing, or something like that.

If you read Robert McNamara's memoirs of the war -- by that time he was considered a leading dove -- he reviews the meticulous planning about the bombing of the North, but does not even mention his decision to sharply escalate the bombing of the South at the same time that the bombing of the North was begun.

I should say, incidentally, that with regard to Vietnam what I have been discussing is articulate opinion, including the leading part of the peace movement. There is also public opinion, which it turns out is radically different, and that is of some significance. By 1969 around 70 percent of the public felt that the war was not a mistake, but that it was fundamentally wrong and immoral. That was the wording of the polls and that figure remains fairly constant up until the most recent polls just a few years ago. The figures are pretty remarkable because people who say that in a poll almost certainly think, I must be the only person in the world that thinks this. They certainly did not read it anywhere, they did not hear it anywhere. But that was popular opinion.

The same is true with regard to many other issues. But for articulate opinion it's pretty much the way I've described -- largely vigorous debate between the hawks and the doves, all on the unexpressed assumption that we own the world. So the only thing that matters is how much is it costing us, or maybe for some more humane types, are we harming too many of them?

Getting back to the election, there was a lot of disappointment among anti-war people -- the majority of the population -- that Congress did not pass any withdrawal legislation. There was a Democratic resolution that was vetoed, but if you look at the resolution closely it was not a withdrawal resolution. There was a good analysis of it by General Kevin Ryan, who was a fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard. He went through it and he said it really should be called a re-missioning proposal. It leaves about the same number of American troops, but they have a slightly different mission.

He said, first of all it allows for a national security exception. If the president says there is a national security issue, he can do whatever he wants -- end of resolution. The second gap is it allows for anti-terrorist activities. Okay, that is whatever you like. Third, it allows for training Iraqi forces. Again, anything you like.

Next it says troops have to remain for protection of U.S. forces and facilities. What are U.S. forces? Well, U.S. forces are those embedded in Iraqi armed units where 60 percent of their fellow soldiers think that they -- U.S. troops, that is -- are legitimate targets of attack. Incidentally, those figures keep going up, so they are probably higher by now. Well, okay, that is plenty of force protection. What facilities need protection was not explained in the Democratic resolution, but facilities include what is called "the embassy." The U.S. embassy in Iraq is nothing like any embassy that has ever existed in history. It's a city inside the green zone, the protected region of Iraq, that the U.S. runs. It's got everything from missiles to McDonalds, anything you want. They didn't build that huge facility because they intend to leave.

That is one facility, but there are others. There are "semi-permanent military bases," which are being built around the country. "Semi-permanent" means permanent, as long as we want.

General Ryan omitted a lot of things. He omitted the fact that the U.S. is maintaining control of logistics and logistics is the core of a modern Army. Right now about 80 percent of the supply is coming in though the south, from Kuwait, and it's going through guerilla territory, easily subject to attack, which means you have to have plenty of troops to maintain that supply line. Plus, of course, it keeps control over the Iraqi Army.

The Democratic resolution excludes the Air Force. The Air Force does whatever it wants. It is bombing pretty regularly and it can bomb more intensively. The resolution also excludes mercenaries, which is no small number -- sources such as the Wall Street Journal estimate the number of mercenaries at about 130,000, approximately the same as the number of troops, which makes some sense. The traditional way to fight a colonial war is with mercenaries, not with your own soldiers -- that is the French Foreign Legion, the British Ghurkas, or the Hessians in the Revolutionary War. That is part of the main reason the draft was dropped -- so you get professional soldiers, not people you pick off the streets.

So, yes, it is re-missioning, but the resolution was vetoed because it was too strong, so we don't even have that. And, yes, that did disappoint a lot of people. However, it would be too strong to say that no high official in Washington called for immediate withdrawal. There were some. The strongest one I know of -- when asked what is the solution to the problem in Iraq -- said it's quite obvious, "Withdraw all foreign forces and withdraw all foreign arms." That official was Condoleeza Rice and she was not referring to U.S. forces, she was referring to Iranian forces and Iranian arms. And that makes sense, too, on the assumption that we own the world because, since we own the world U.S. forces cannot be foreign forces anywhere. So if we invade Iraq or Canada, say, we are the indigenous forces. It's the Iranians that are foreign forces.

I waited for a while to see if anyone, at least in the press or journals, would point out that there was something funny about this. I could not find a word. I think everyone regarded that as a perfectly sensible comment. But I could not see a word from anyone who said, wait a second, there are foreign forces there, 150,000 American troops, plenty of American arms.

So it is reasonable that when British sailors were captured in the Gulf by Iranian forces, there was debate, "Were they in Iranian borders or in Iraqi borders? Actually there is no answer to this because there is no territorial boundary, and that was pointed out. It was taken for granted that if the British sailors were in Iraqi waters, then Iran was guilty of a crime by intervening in foreign territory. But Britain is not guilty of a crime by being in Iraqi territory, because Britain is a U.S. client state, and we own the world, so they are there by right.

What about the possible next war, Iran? There have been very credible threats by the U.S. and Israel -- essentially a U.S. client -- to attack Iran. There happens to be something called the UN Charter which says that -- in Article 2 -- the threat or use of force in international affairs is a crime. "Threat or use of force."

Does anybody care? No, because we're an outlaw state by definition, or to be more precise, our threats and use of force are not foreign, they're indigenous because we own the world. Therefore, it's fine. So there are threats to bomb Iran -- maybe we will and maybe we won't. That is the debate that goes on. Is it legitimate if we decide to do it? People might argue it's a mistake. But does anyone say it would be illegitimate? For example, the Democrats in Congress refuse to put in an amendment that would require the Executive to inform Congress if it intends to bomb Iran -- to consult, inform. Even that was not accepted.

The whole world is aghast at this possibility. It would be monstrous. A leading British military historian, Correlli Barnett, wrote recently that if the U.S. does attack, or Israel does attack, it would be World War III. The attack on Iraq has been horrendous enough. Apart from devastating Iraq, the UN High Commission on Refugees reviewed the number of displaced people -- they estimate 4.2 million, over 2 million fled the country, another 2 million fleeing within the country. That is in addition to the numbers killed, which if you extrapolate from the last studies, are probably approaching a million.

It was anticipated by U.S. intelligence and other intelligence agencies and independent experts that an attack on Iraq would probably increase the threat of terror and nuclear proliferation. But that went way beyond what anyone expected. Well known terrorism specialists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank estimated -- using mostly government statistics -- that what they call "the Iraq effect" increased terror by a factor of seven, and that is pretty serious. And that gives you an indication of the ranking of protection of the population in the priority list of leaders. It's very low.

So what would the Iran effect be? Well, that is incalculable. It could be World War III. Very likely a massive increase in terror, who knows what else. Even in the states right around Iraq, which don't like Iran -- Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey -- even there the large majority would prefer to see a nuclear armed Iran to any U.S. military action, and they are right, military action could be devastating. It doesn't mean we won't do it. There is very little discussion here of the illegitimacy of doing it, again on the assumption that anything we do is legitimate, it just might cost too much.

Is there a possible solution to the U.S./Iran crisis? Well, there are some plausible solutions. One possibility would be an agreement that allows Iran to have nuclear energy, like every signer of the non-proliferation treaty, but not to have nuclear weapons. In addition, it would call for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. That would include Iran, Israel, which has hundreds of nuclear weapons, and any U.S. or British forces deployed in the region. A third element of a solution would be for the United States and other nuclear states to obey their legal obligation, by unanimous agreement of the World Court, to make good-faith moves to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.

Is this feasible? Well, it's feasible on one assumption, that the United States and Iran become functioning democratic societies, because what I have just quoted happens to be the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the populations in Iran and the United States. On everything that I mentioned there is an overwhelming majority. So, yes, there would be a very feasible solution if these two countries were functioning democratic societies, meaning societies in which public opinion has some kind of effect on policy. The problem in the United States is the inability of organizers to do something in a population that overwhelmingly agrees with them and to make that current policy. Of course, it can be done. Peasants in Bolivia can do it, we can obviously do it here.

Can we do anything to make Iran a more democratic society? Not directly, but indirectly we can. We can pay attention to the dissidents and the reformists in Iran who are struggling courageously to turn Iran into a more democratic society. And we know exactly what they are saying, they are very outspoken about it. They are pleading with the United States to withdraw the threats against Iran. The more we threaten Iran, the more we give a gift to the reactionary, religious fanatics in the government. You make threats, you strengthen them. That is exactly what is happening. The threats have lead to repression, predictably.

Now the Americans claim they are outraged by the repression, which we should protest, but we should recognize that the repression is the direct and predictable consequence of the actions that the U.S. government is taking. So if you take actions, and then they have predictable consequences, condemning the consequences is total hypocrisy.

Incidentally, in the case of Cuba about two-thirds of Americans think we ought to end the embargo and all threats and enter into diplomatic relations. And that has been true ever since polls have been taken -- for about 30 years. The figure varies, but it's roughly there. Zero effect on policy, in Iran, Cuba, and elsewhere.

So there is a problem and that problem is that the United States is just not a functioning democracy. Public opinion does not matter and among articulate and elite opinion that is a principle -- it shouldn't matter. The only principle that matters is we own the world and the rest of you shut up, you know, whether you're abroad or at home.

So, yes, there is a potential solution to the very dangerous problem, it's essentially the same solution: do something to turn our own country into a functioning democracy. But that is in radical opposition to the fundamental presupposition of all elite discussions, mainly that we own the world and that these questions don't arise and the public should have no opinion on foreign policy, or any policy.

Once, when I was driving to work, I was listening to NPR. NPR is supposed to be the kind of extreme radical end of the spectrum. I read a statement somewhere, I don't know if it's true, but it was a quote from Obama, who is the hope of the liberal doves, in which he allegedly said that the spectrum of discussion in the United States extends between two crazy extremes, Rush Limbaugh and NPR. The truth, he said, is in the middle and that is where he is going to be, in the middle, between the crazies.

NPR then had a discussion -- it was like being at the Harvard faculty club -- serious people, educated, no grammatical errors, who know what they're talking about, usually polite. The discussion was about the so-called missile defense system that the U.S. is trying to place in Czechoslovakia and Poland -- and the Russian reaction. The main issue was, "What is going on with the Russians? Why are they acting so hostile and irrational? Are they trying to start a new Cold War? There is something wrong with those guys. Can we calm them down and make them less paranoid?"

The main specialist they called in, I think from the Pentagon or somewhere, pointed out, accurately, that a missile defense system is essentially a first-strike weapon. That is well known by strategic analysts on all sides. If you think about it for a minute, it's obvious why. A missile defense system is never going to stop a first strike, but it could, in principle, if it ever worked, stop a retaliatory strike. If you attack some country with a first strike, and practically wipe it out, if you have a missile defense system, and prevent them from retaliating, then you would be protected, or partially protected. If a country has a functioning missile defense system it will have more options for carrying out a first strike. Okay, obvious, and not a secret. It's known to every strategic analyst. I can explain it to my grandchildren in two minutes and they understand it.

So on NPR it is agreed that a missile defense system is a first-strike weapon. But then comes the second part of the discussion. Well, say the pundits, the Russians should not be worried about this. For one thing because it's not enough of a system to stop their retaliation, so therefore it's not yet a first-strike weapon against them. Then they said it is kind of irrelevant anyway because it is directed against Iran, not against Russia.

Okay, that was the end of the discussion. So, point one, missile defense is a first-strike weapon; second, it's directed against Iran. Now, you can carry out a small exercise in logic. Does anything follow from those two assumptions? Yes, what follows is it's a first-strike weapon against Iran. Since the U.S. owns the world what could be wrong with having a first-strike weapon against Iran. So the conclusion is not mentioned. It is not necessary. It follows from the fact that we own the world.

Maybe a year ago or so, Germany sold advanced submarines to Israel, which were equipped to carry missiles with nuclear weapons. Why does Israel need submarines with nuclear armed missiles? Well, there is only one imaginable reason and everyone in Germany with a brain must have understood that -- certainly their military system does -- it's a first-strike weapon against Iran. Israel can use German subs to illustrate to Iranians that if they respond to an Israeli attack they will be vaporized.

The fundamental premises of Western imperialism are extremely deep. The West owns the world and now the U.S. runs the West, so, of course, they go along. The fact that they are providing a first-strike weapon for attacking Iran probably, I'm guessing now, raised no comment because why should it?

You can forget about history, it does not matter, it's kind of "old fashioned," boring stuff we don't need to know about. But most countries pay attention to history. So, for example, for the United States there is no discussion of the history of U.S./Iranian relations. Well, for the U.S. there is only one event in Iranian history -- in 1979 Iranians overthrew the tyrant that the U.S. was backing and took some hostages for over a year. That happened and they had to be punished for that.

But for Iranians their history is that for over 50 years, literally without a break, the U.S. has been torturing Iranians. In 1953 the U.S. overthrew the parliamentary government and installed a brutal tyrant, the Shah, and kept supporting him while he compiled one of the worst human rights records in the world -- torture, assassination, anything you like. In fact, President Carter, when he visited Iran in December 1978, praised the Shah because of the love shown to him by his people, and so on and so forth, which probably accelerated the overthrow. Of course, Iranians have this odd way of remembering what happened to them and who was behind it. When the Shah was overthrown, the Carter administration immediately tried to instigate a military coup by sending arms to Iran through Israel to try to support military force to overthrow the government. We immediately turned to supporting Iraq, that is Saddam Hussein, and his invasion of Iran. Saddam was executed for crimes he committed in 1982, by his standards not very serious crimes -- complicity in killing 150 people. Well, there was something missing in that account -- 1982 is a very important year in U.S./Iraqi relations. That is the year in which Ronald Reagan removed Iraq from the list of states supporting terrorism so that the U.S. could start supplying Iraq with weapons for its invasion of Iran, including the means to develop weapons of mass destruction, chemical and nuclear weapons. That is 1982. A year later Donald Rumsfeld was sent to firm up the deal. Well, Iranians may very well remember that this led to a war in which hundreds of thousands of them were slaughtered with U.S. aid going to Iraq. They may well remember that the year after the war was over, in 1989, the U.S. government invited Iraqi nuclear engineers to come to the United States for advanced training in developing nuclear weapons.

What about the Russians? They have a history too. One part of the history is that in the last century Russia was invaded and practically destroyed three times through Eastern Europe. You can look back and ask, when was the last time that the U.S. was invaded and practically destroyed through Canada or Mexico? That doesn't happen. We crush others and we are always safe. But the Russians don't have that luxury. Now, in 1990 a remarkable event took place. I was kind of shocked, frankly. Gorbachev agreed to let Germany be unified, meaning join the West and be militarized within a hostile military alliance. This is Germany, which twice in that century practically destroyed Russia. That's a pretty remarkable agreement.

There was a quid pro quo. Then-president George Bush I agreed that NATO would not expand to the East. The Russians also demanded, but did not receive, an agreement for a nuclear-free zone from the Artic to the Baltic, which would give them a little protection from nuclear attack. That was the agreement in 1990. Then Bill Clinton came into office, the so-called liberal. One of the first things he did was to rescind the agreement, unilaterally, and expand NATO to the East.

For the Russians that's pretty serious, if you remember the history. They lost 25 million people in the last World War and over 3 million in World War I. But since the U.S. owns the world, if we want to threaten Russia, that is fine. It is all for freedom and justice, after all, and if they make unpleasant noises about it we wonder why they are so paranoid. Why is Putin screaming as if we're somehow threatening them, since we can't be threatening anyone, owning the world.

One of the other big issues on the front pages now is Chinese "aggressiveness." There is a lot of concern about the fact that the Chinese are building up their missile forces. Is China planning to conquer the world? Big debates about it. Well, what is really going on? For years China has been in the lead in trying to prevent the militarization of space. If you look at the debates and the Disarmament Commission of the UN General Assembly, the votes are 160 to 1 or 2. The U.S. insists on the militarization of space. It will not permit the outer space treaty to explicitly bar military relations in space.

Clinton's position was that the U.S. should control space for military purposes. The Bush administration is more extreme. Their position is the U.S. should own space, their words, We have to own space for military purposes. So that is the spectrum of discussion here. The Chinese have been trying to block it and that is well understood. You read the most respectable journal in the world, I suppose, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and you find leading strategic analysts, John Steinbrunner and Nancy Gallagher, a couple of years ago, warning that the Bush administration's aggressive militarization is leading to what they call "ultimate doom." Of course, there is going to be a reaction to it. You threaten people with destruction, they are going to react. These analysts call on peace-loving nations to counter Bush's aggressive militarism. They hope that China will lead peace-loving nations to counter U.S. aggressiveness. It's a pretty remarkable comment on the impossibility of achieving democracy in the United States. Again, the logic is pretty elementary. Steinbrunner and Gallagher are assuming that the United States cannot be a democratic society; it's not one of the options, so therefore we hope that maybe China will do something.

Well, China finally did something. It signaled to the United States that they noticed that we were trying to use space for military purposes, so China shot down one of their satellites. Everyone understands why -- the mili- tarization and weaponization of space depends on satellites. While missiles are very difficult or maybe impossible to stop, satellites are very easy to shoot down. You know where they are. So China is saying, "Okay, we understand you are militarizing space. We're going to counter it not by militarizing space, we can't compete with you that way, but by shooting down your satellites." That is what was behind the satellite shooting. Every military analyst certainly understood it and every lay person can understand it. But take a look at the debate. The discussion was about, "Is China trying it conquer the world by shooting down one of its own satellites?"

About a year ago there was a new rash of articles and headlines on the front page about the "Chinese military build-up." The Pentagon claimed that China had increased its offensive military capacity -- with 400 missiles, which could be nuclear armed. Then we had a debate about whether that proves China is trying to conquer the world or the numbers are wrong, or something.

Just a little footnote. How many offensive nuclear armed missiles does the United States have? Well, it turns out to be 10,000. China may now have maybe 400, if you believe the hawks. That proves that they are trying to conquer the world.

It turns out, if you read the international press closely, that the reason China is building up its military capacity is not only because of U.S. aggressiveness all over the place, but the fact that the United States has improved its targeting capacities so it can now destroy missile sites in a much more sophisticated fashion wherever they are, even if they are mobile. So who is trying to conquer the world? Well, obviously the Chinese because since we own it, they are trying to conquer it.

It's all too easy to continue with this indefinitely. Just pick your topic. It's a good exercise to try. This simple principle, "we own the world," is sufficient to explain a lot of the discussion about foreign affairs.

I will just finish with a word from George Orwell. In the introduction to Animal Farm he said, England is a free society, but it's not very different from the totalitarian monster I have been describing. He says in England unpopular ideas can be suppressed without the use of force. Then he goes on to give some dubious examples. At the end he turns to a very brief explanation, actually two sentences, but they are to the point. He says, one reason is the press is owned by wealthy men who have every reason not to want certain ideas to be expressed. And the second reason -- and I think a more important one -- is a good education. If you have gone to the best schools and graduated from Oxford and Cambridge, and so on, you have instilled in you the understanding that there are certain things it would not do to say; actually, it would not do to think. That is the primary way to prevent unpopular ideas from being expressed.

The ideas of the overwhelming majority of the population, who don't attend Harvard, Princeton, Oxford and Cambridge, enable them to react like human beings, as they often do. There is a lesson there for activists.

Saturday, January 5, 2008

dry your eyes, dear comrades


A Review of the World Junior Championships Semifinal Match Between Russia and Sweden

Americans finally got a chance to watch this beauty of a tournament on TV thanks to the glorious NHL Network. This meant I was able to watch the Russia – Sweden semifinal match from the comfy confines of my couch rather than scouring the internet to watch it online on a grainy and always buffering video player. Yes.

The Russians are coming off three straight world junior gold medal game appearances and three straight losses to Canada in said games. They are also coming off a brutal seven losses and one tie shellacking in the “Super” Series against Canada. Yet, they looked pretty good against the Czechs in the quarters and were now facing a Swedish team who recently defeated the juggernaut that is the Canadian national junior team, the first time the Canadians have lost in a few years. Despite producing a slew of great players and having success at the senior level, the Swedes' junior program has been not very good for a very long time: out of the medals since ’96 and no golds since ’81. How is a nation that has produced Lidstrom, Forsberg, and Sundin (Mats not Ronnie) go through a drought like that? Some thoughts on what I found was a highly entertaining game (though I guess I could watch a Russian national team practice and find it highly entertaining; actually, judging by the result of the game, this may be the preferred way to watch the Russians play).

  • The first period was your classic feeling out, “this is a huge game let’s not do something stupid early,” period.

  • Viktor Tikhonov Jr., grandson of legendary Russian coach and legendary Russian a-hole Viktor Tikhonov Sr., has been the Russians' best forward this tournament and was once again today. This guy has a similar stride and the same bull in a china shop style as Ovechkin, and like Alex he also is not afraid to shoot the puck. The kid has some sick moves which he showed off late in the game with the score tied when he blew by three Swedish defenders and beat the fourth with an insane between the legs dangle, only to try and make another move in close on the goalie and get stuffed. Would have been the goal of the tourney without a doubt, but alas. But more impressive was this guy’s work in his own zone and on the PK. Coach Nemchinov (who probably deserves his own post) alternated Tikhonov and Maxim Mamin as the lone forwards on the 4-3 PK to begin OT. Tikhonov was making smart and aggressive defensive plays all night. How is it possible that he has been passed over twice in the NHL draft already? Great player, his game is probably more tailored to North America than the large rink. Seems like he doing OK in Severstal as a 19 year old, but someone should definitely try to bring him over here. Baby Ovechkin.

  • Russian defensive prospects have been much maligned in recent years, in part due to the declining presence of Russian defensemen in the NHL. It’s seems obvious that this is based less on a lack of quality Russian defensemen and in larger part to 1) the absence of a transfer agreement; 2) the skyrocketing and lightly taxed Russian Super League salaries; 3) the difficulty of training any defensemen, North American or European, to play in the NHL; and 4) the preference, perhaps short-sighted in some cases, of Russian players (and families and agents, I imagine) of playing at home in the RSL to riding buses and making $60,000 a year in the AHL. There are a plethora of examples of Russian defensemen who may or may not have been able to become solid NHL players but who will never have had the chance because they opted to stay at home, but there are some notable young d-men who are in the process of joining that group: Alexei Emelin, Kiril Koltsov, Ilja Nikulin.

  • Where was I going with this? Despite this phenomenon, that Russian defensemen are almost surely better than North American scouts and fans rate them, the group of defenders on this year’s junior team nevertheless does still appear to be lacking the big-name game breakers that previous teams have had. However, I was impressed by the group’s top three: Evgeni Kurbatov, Jakov Seleznev, and Vyachaslav Voinov. Kurbatov appears to be a tough as nails guy in the mold of a Dimitri Yuskevish, who has been playing in the RSL the last few years literally on one leg. Yuskevich is as tough and gutsy as they come and if Kurbatov plays half as hard, he can hang his head high. Kurbatov was a horse in this one, on the ice a ton, blocking shots, and generally exuding a certain amount of calmness. He’s another player that’s been passed over twice now in the NHL draft. I wonder if he’ll come over, but there seems to be little doubt based on his performance in Pradubice that he has the ability to play in the NHL one day. Seleznev is a bit smoother and may have been the team’s best one on one defender, despite getting walked around by 16 year old Swede wunderkind, Viktor Hedman. Seleznev has some offensive upside to his game as well. Not sure what his draft status is but he reminds me of a poor man’s Andrei Markov. And finally, Voinov is the next Kasparitis/Danny Markov, the Russian Ulf Samuelsson. He’s mean and hits hard, and I didn’t see him running around and getting out of position trying to take anyone’s head off. North American scouts are much more likely to be attracted to this kind of Russian than Kurbatov or Seleznev, but I’m not sure he’ll be the better player. Overall, I think the entire group played fairly well today. I didn’t see much of Maxim Chudinov who I thought looked good in the Super Series and against the Czechs. Marat Kalimulin had a couple of terrible plays on the Power Play, Yuri Alexandrov had an ugly last man back turnover, and Doronin, we’ll get to him. The one thing they seem to lack is the huge offensive threat from the back end, like a Gonchar or Zubov. I guess the kid Ivan Vishnevskyi is supposed to be pretty slick and skilled, and a nightmare in his own end, but he didn’t make the team.

  • It was fairly even through the game’s first half I thought when Russia began to turn the tide. Finally, late in the second the Russians drew first blood. Alexei Cherepanov corralled a puck in the neutral zone and held on to it just long enough to let 17 year old Nikita Filatov gather some speed before hitting him in stride outside Sweden's blue line. Filatov did the rest as he exploded by the Swedish defender wide and then brought the puck back inside and tucking it somewhere between the goalie’s pads. It’s the kind of goal you dream about scoring every time you walk to the rink (at least I do, dream that is). Filatov most of the time looks like the real deal, at least when his baby face is not making him look 15. He led Russia in shots on goal for the tournament but had the puck roll off his stick late in the third on a play that would have put the game out of reach. He’s also fanned on a pass to an open Cherepanov early in the second that would have been a tap-in. Maddeningly inconsistent brilliance, but Russia should not be in a position where it’s placing its scoring hopes on the shoulders of a 17 year old (2 17 year olds if you count Cherepanov). Filatov on ability alone would be a top 15 pick in next year’s draft it seems, but no transfer agreement, who knows.

  • Which brings us to Cherepanov. Ah, Cherry, he who sat in humiliation for two hours at last year’s draft as scores of players not anywhere near as talented heard their names called. Playing on what was essentially the second line, Cherry was the team’s most consistent offensive threat. He can absolutely wire the puck, though I wish he hit the net with his slapshot more, and he’s very good at controlling the puck down low. There’s nothing I hate more than the intellectually lazy and borderline rascist theory that Russians are skilled but lazy and selfish and care more about looking good than winning, etc. It’s basically nothing more than an easy to follow (and propagate) storyline forged from groupthink and ignorance. However, I hate it almost as much when it’s given credence. And when Cherry-bomb took a dumb and lazy and selfish, and worse, totally unnecessary, hooking penalty midway through the third, it not only provided ammunition to those Russian bashers, but really changed the momentum of the game and cost Russia a shot at gold. Russia had been controlling the flow most of the third and effectively protecting their one goal lead when Cherepanov, after a pretty good shift in the offensive zone actually, reached out and hooked a Swede at the blue line where, I think, he had a defenseman back covering on the play. No idea what he was thinking, but Sweden, of course, tied the game on a patient, pretty move by Robin Figren, and they basically dominated the rest of the period and the OT.

  • Russia valiantly killed off a PK in OT and I was holding to the belief that if it went to a shootout Russia would almost surely have the advantage. But unsurprisingly, it wouldn’t come to that. Mikael Backlund blew by poor Pavel Doronin and made a nice move to slip it through Sergei Bobrovsky and end it. The only few times I noticed Doronin before that were for nice plays he made, one was a great aggressive play he made to start the PK in OT, but he got beat badly and you know he’s gotta be hurting right now. You’ve got to give credit to the Swedes though; they never stopped battling and Backlund, Finger, and Patrik Berglund were particularly good (it did kill me to watch their batch of blonde haired, blue eyed kids who live in a nation where there’s no crime, high education, awesome social services, beautiful, smart women, all singing their national anthem out of tune after they won). Berglund even tried the dick-move where you turn the blade over and control the puck with just the tip of the toe as its perpendicular to the ice. It’s what all the skilled pricks try at open ice-hockey. Berglund did it in the last minutes of a tied world junior championship semi-final.

  • As for the keeper, Bobrovsky. He played great, couldn’t be blamed on either goals and made a bunch of difficult saves. It was the first time ever, I think, that I’ve watched a Russian junior team and not been afraid that a back-breaking, terrible goal was just around the corner. All in all, it’s disappointing that I won’t be watching these guys losing to Canada in the finals for the forth year in a row. Instead, I’ll be cheering them on against the filthy Americans for oh so shameful bronze. Go get it, boys.

Monday, December 31, 2007

so long stinktown

This is the time of year that we generally see every jerk with a pen, or blog, compile his/her best of the year list, on anything from films to food to favorite trip to the laundromat. I’m no different than the other wannabe proselytizers out there, so I offer you my favorite musical releases of the past annum. One important caveat is the admission that I did not listen to much new music this past year. Only recently did I get back into the downloading game and thus did not get a chance to listen to what I imagine are some pretty good albums. Hard to believe that there were new releases by Les Savy Fav, Blonde Redhead, and Pinback that I haven’t peeped yet, but that’s what happens when you have a wonky audio-out connection on your computer for most of the year. So this is a list of my favorite music from 2007, nothing more, nothing less, just the stuff I’ve been digging on. In no particular order except the crown of the pack goes first.

Radiohead, In Rainbows – you’d have to imagine that if the same album was put out by an unheard of band from Brooklyn named after a Faust song, this would have been at the top of the lists for all the unctuous, musicophilic critics out there, *cough*pitchfork*cough*. Yawn, just another near perfect album from Radiohead, perhaps a little softer and more palatable for some folks compared to their recent efforts. Unlike Hail to the Thief, not a single weak track on this one, though I think “Faust Arp” could have been space better spent. Nonetheless, the rhythm section is brilliant as usual, beautiful strings as always, a bit more finger-picking than I remember, and Thom seems to turn down the overtly political and turn up the sensual and personal. Once again I’m left wondering if Ed actually appears on the album. I played this constantly for three days but could still listen to it now and melt away into my headphones and couch. God bless these guys. Oh yea, and they gave it away for free. Fuck you, record industry.

Wilco, Sky Blue Sky – For a long time I had heard of a band named Wilco, and I guess I had a vague sense that they were considered “alt-country,” but that was probably the extent of my familiarity. I listened to Yankee Hotel Foxtrot once on the road, probably somewhere between Alabama and Ohio, but I can’t really recall what I thought about it, not surprising given my mental and physical state at the time (I think I liked it). Unexpectedly, I managed to listen to Sky Blue Sky right when it came out, thank you AOL streaming, and fell in love from the get go. Just a beautiful collection of songs, some plaintive ballads with a few rockers thrown in, but all brilliantly and simply crafted with a tender touch that is as rare as it is awesome. Highlights include “Either Way,” “Impossible Germany,” and “Sky Blue Sky,” but most of the numbers on here do the job. The guitar work is impeccable throughout, but the solo on “Impossible Germany” is particularly amazing. I guess I should reach into their back catalogue to see if it’s all this good, but if this is the only Wilco album I ever hear, I’ll be more than satisfied.

Battles, Mirrored – if you only listen to one album from a math rock supergoup in 2007, this is it. Stone solid grooves pervade while crunching rhythms lock you in for a nice, long head-bobbing, foot-tapping session. A bunch of tricky little guitar parts and weird sounding keyboards to keep the other parts of your brain occupied too. My only problem with these guys is that they like to go to the Turkey’s Nest, a place I have always been too scared/have better sense to visit.

Animal Collective/Panda Bear, Strawberry Jams/Person Pitch – I hate to group these guys together as one entry, but let’s face it, I would have been hard pressed to identify which is which in a taste test. Not much more I can tell you about these that hasn’t been said in the numerous glowing reviews they’ve received, each well deserved. “Peacebone” on Strawberry Jams and “Bros” on Person Pitch could be two of the best tracks of the year if not decade (Anthony Lane once told me that great reviews must contain obnoxious hyperbole). I feel simultaneously smarter and dumber when listening to this stuff. Both albums seem less frighteningly insane than their previous efforts; glad to see they’re at least beginning to inch back towards Earth from the far reaches of outer space.

LCD Soundsystem, Sound of Silver – Again, this is on everyone’s best of list, and I think I read somewhere that even Jessica Alba likes it, but the truth is, this shit is pretty stellar any way you slice it. If there's any release that challenges In Rainbows for supremacy, this is it. Somehow it works whether you’re just chilling it out and coming down, or getting hyped up to go out and dance (or if you’re like me, sit in the corner and talk about Arrested Development). Great songs, witty lyrics, and impeccable “production,” though this is probably better described as “creation” as it’s all being done on a laptop anyway. There isn't a single note, beat, or utterance that isn't perfectly placed and joyfully crafted. Pure gorgeousness. I can’t wait for the next album from this dude.

Broken Social Scene Presents: Kevin Drew, Spirit If… – Broken Social Scene leader Kevin Drew puts out what I guess is a solo album and, no surprise, it sounds a heck of a lot like a Broken Social Scene album, which is to say, it’s really good. The opener, “Farewell to the Pressure Kids,” blasts you in the face before the album ultimately settles into a mellow vibe that is calm yet filled with emotion. “Tbtf” (an acronym for “too beautiful to fuck”) is, I imagine, about real life girlfriend Leslie Feist, who is definitely just that. As an aside, my many critics will point to the inclusion of Spirit If… and my omission of Feist’s The Reminder from this list as further evidence of my misogynist tendencies, an allegation leveled at me in the past. However, I assure everyone out there that I love Feist and that album does not appear here only because I have not had the chance to listen to it (remember, wonky audio-out for most of the year). Don’t let the fact that there are no other female artists prominently featured on any of the other albums I’ve selected fool you. I love and respect women as people and musicians. Promise.

The Whore Moans, 5 Song Demo – “Lock up your daughters, hide your wives, born on the underside of hell’s own face, I found them outside in the dumpster, I hosed them off, and I brought them inside, have you heard of the rock’n’roll apocalypse that comes raining down from the sky, ladies and gentlemen, The Whore Moans!” This collection’s intro perfectly sums up the sound and prepares you for what’s to come – blistering hardcore fury, born on the underside of hell’s own face, indeed. The opening track, “Disappear,” is the set’s gem. The overriding guitar riff is drenched in bright distortion and provides anthemic bombast throughout. The highlight though is the shrill, shrieking, that’s-gotta-leave-your-throat-sore-as-hell vocals, classic hardcore screaming filled with equal parts desperation and jubilation. It sounds like homeboy was up all night hanging out with The Cramps, drinking jager, and stuffing razor blades into candy apples. I don’t listen to too much of this kind of music anymore, but it’s a carnal, guilty pleasure when done right. If you can’t crack open a few cold ones, crank the volume to the right, and enjoy this with some friends, you may want to check for a pulse.

Beirut, Lon Gisland EP – Ah teenage kids from New Mexico writing Balkan influenced World music. Ain’t America grand? Leader Zach Condon has a bit of the faux-afflatus affliction that I guess some teenage potential-geniuses, heavy on the potential, are prone to, but you can’t deny great songs. A solid collection of tunes featuring some pretty ukulele and slick horn lines. “Elephant Gun” was the feel good hit of the spring. What’s that term for a word that sounds like the definition of that word? (“Ring” is the example off the top of the head). Well, the first part of “Scenic World” (once all the instruments come in) is the musical equivalent of that phenomenon. Beautiful. A nice addition to the EP would have been their rendition of “Ederlezi,” a traditional Roma song. You blew it on that one, young Zachary.

Born Ruffians, Born Ruffians EP – A group of teenagers from Ontario, Canada (not to be confused with Ontario, California) put out one of the catchiest records of the year. Guitar driven pop with some enthusiastic melodies. Reminds me a bit of early Pixies with Frank Black’s deep and powerful howling replaced by a higher pitched sort of squeal, and it works just as well. This isn’t going to change anyone’s life, but I’m a sucker for this type of stuff when done well, and these gents sure do. Opener “This Sentence Will Ruin/Save Your Life” and its avalanche drum fills are the highlight.

Black Kids, Wizard of Ahhhs EP – Why are there so many EPs on this list? Is it because I have been caught up in the hype of the next big thing and are checking out bands just starting out, or do I just have a worryingly short attention span? These guys were definitely the victim/recipient of some serious internet buzz, but for once, it was backed up by some substance. Breezy pop songs that are more than overflowing with youthful exuberance belie the feeling you get that these guys know exactly just what they’re doing. “I'm Not Gonna Teach Your Boyfriend How to Dance With You” is retardedly good and I have the feeling it caused significant wear on ipod repeat buttons all over Williamsburg.

Soulja Boy, Crank That (Soulja Boy)­­ – The first time I heard this song I was in a car on Gramercy Park doing two things I absolutely hate: 1) driving, and 2) listening to mainstream hip-hop radio. The second time I heard this song I was at a wedding in Puerto Rico doing two things I absolutely hate: 1) listening to wedding dance music, and 2) drinking by myself without either a guitar or TV remote in hand. On both occasions though I was transplanted away from my detestations to a magical land of steel drum beats and unintelligibly humorous rapping. This song is pure fun and ridiculousness, as is the dance that accompanies it, and it gets me pretty hyped to go out and do my thing, whatever that is. Even better than the song though is this synch-up made by some fan, just awesome.


Friday, December 14, 2007

shadows on leaves


i can turn and walk away
or i can fire the gun
staring at the sky
staring at the sun

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Local Monkey Ruins Family’s Picnic, Makes Onlookers’ Day




Mr. Grieves gorges on cantaloupe as if feasting on the blood of his enemies.

Manual Antonio National Park, Costa Rica – A large water cooler containing fruit, potato chips, soda, and cold cuts, was broken into and burglarized yesterday by an adult, male, rhesus monkey known as Mr. Grieves, as flocks of international tourists stood by guffawing and “uh-oh”-ing. The monkey contraband’s proprietor, Helen Christianson, of Birmingham, Alabama, pleaded with the Mr. Grieves to “come back with our picnic-y food, you damn monkey!” to no avail. A group of slack-jawed, wide-eyed onlookers could only fumble with their digital cameras and point and laugh, with one German backpacker exhorting, “Ach! Das kamera phone ist ein...nuisance kamera!” Grievesy, as he is affectionately known to park employees, was last seen peeing in the direction of a Canadian couple and scurrying off into the jungle. He could not be reached for comment.

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

where have we heard this before


"It is professed that as soon as we leave [Afghanistan], there will be a slaughter, slaughter, slaughter. My experience in Afghanistan indicates that, probably, there will be a civil war, [and] there will be fighting. This is an internecine war. When I was flying out of Afghanistan last year, I thought that after our withdrawal some part of NDPA would be wiped out by the vengeful Islamic movement." (Prohanov, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn [International Affairs] #7, 1988)

This shouldn’t be news to anyone paying attention to the last 100 years or so, but there’s some interesting work coming out of Canada comparing media performance during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US/UK occupation of Iraq. Surprisingly, malnourished rebels living in caves posed as great a threat to Moscow as a sanction-crippled Iraq (who, as the American Academy of Arts and Science pointed out, was the weakest country in the region, pp. 42-44) did to the US. If anyone needs a refresher on how the mainstream media works in the West, Noam drops it as well as anyone.

Speaking of the US’s similarities to “totalitarian” states, did anyone catch Karl Rove on Charlie Rose? Isn’t this exactly what Winston Smith’s job description was?

Thursday, December 6, 2007

Just because you stopped developing as a person years ago, it doesn’t mean long-cherished art cannot continue to grow and improve

The Simpsons enters its 20th year next fall equaling Gunsmoke as the longest running fictionalized TV show in American history. Though the extent of overlap between fans of the two shows is undetermined and highly contentious in certain parts, they will nevertheless soon share a special distinction in American pop culture history. Somewhere out there Dennis Weaver, aka Buck McCoy, is smiling in his grave (and still preaching vegetarianism). Despite, or perhaps because of, its accolades, influence, and increasingly entrenched position in the pantheon of TV history, the prevailing wisdom, and it has existed for years now, is that The Simpsons is simply not as good as it once was. I have heard this refrain from commentators, pundits, strangers, and most stingingly, friends, fellow rabid Simpsons fans whose sense of comedy, and in fact their sense of self-identity vis-à-vis this cruel world, was derived from years of watching the Simpsons and retelling and reliving its greatest moments. Not sharing this opinion, I have set out to explain why they feel the way they do (Part I, below), and why they are wrong (Part II, coming soon).

There is a narrow range of maneuverability within this discussion: The Simpsons can be considered anywhere from great but, self-evidently of course, not as great as at its peak, to not particularly good and unworthy of remaining on the air. What goes unasserted in the contemporary canon is that The Simpsons has continued to develop over the years, adding new elements, particularly a sophisticated visual aesthetic, redefining and refining the absurdist comedy, and bringing multi-dimensional nuances to its brilliantly crafted characters. Put simply, The Simpsons is as good today as it has ever been.

Part I: Examining the Reasons for the Perceived Decline

Maintaining that The Simpsons are still producing at a high-as-ever level these days is not to suggest that the show hasn’t seen dramatic changes in its timbre and touch over the course of its life. Both an explanation for and the inevitable result of its incredible longevity, The Simpsons has undergone significant transformations in style and substance from its first tentative steps out of the shadows of The Tracey Ullman Show, to the loudly recognized heights of the Conan O’Brien days, and on and on through its most recent and increasingly experimental version.1 This broad arc of change could by itself contribute to the audience’s change in perception. (It COULD lead to the change in perception…) However, it is the changing context of the audience itself, encompassing the psychological needs of the individual viewer, working in tandem with the changes in the show, that has created the diminished “assessment” of the show in recent years. The audience has necessarily moved on from a time and place when and where a particular era of The Simpsons possessed special meaning in its lives. As people must leave that time and place at some point, and as that particular era of the Simpsons becomes further removed, with current era Simpsons resembling it less and less, those feelings of familiarity, nostalgia, comfort, et al. begin to fade. Ultimately, that same enjoyment one received from watching the Simpsons is no longer there, and diminished quality is offered as the explanation.

Formative Years Theory

The core of The Simpsons’ most devoted, rabid fanbase, those that began watching from the beginning and have literally grown up with the show, come from a range of, basically, ’75 to ’82 birthdays.2 These are the viewers that were old enough to remember watching their first Simpsons from the first season; and young enough to think it was new and exciting, that it spoke to them in a way that other shows and other people didn’t; old enough to continue watching and get drawn in as the show moved away from catchphrases into darker material, expanding the cultural references and directing its lens beyond the family and towards broader society; and young enough to have the time and desire to watch a cartoon slowly grow and progress into something more mature and sophisticated, in many ways its own chronology of development mirroring that of its audience.

What is the significance of Simpsons uberfans coming from basically the same narrow age group? It helps to explain why there is such an evaluative consensus on the general timeline of the series, including notably the presumed mid-series-ish “golden age,” as well as the near unanimity on its recent, or at least post-golden age, decline. Simpsons fans fell in love with the show during the show’s early years (’90 – ’94),3 which were not incoincidentally its fans’ “formative years,” that is, the pre-adolescent to adolescent, highly influencable period in which one’s comedic sensibility and even broader outlook on American society and culture could be derived in large part from art: a film movement, the written word, a musical group, or a TV show, in this case, The Simpsons. The mechanism, beginning for most sometime between late elementary and early high school, was essentially the same: a semi-dysfunctional ensemble of characters in Anytown, er, Springfield, USA, portrayed with equal parts sarcasm and earnestness, condescendence and flattery, helped craft a Weltanschauung in its devotees, comprised of a rebellious conscience, a suspicious view of authority figures, a japing attitude toward ambition, and a taste for the ironic and the hilarious.

Beyond the means to digest their surroundings, The Simpsons created in its vanguard the ability, if not necessity, to often, if not almost always, relate specific personal experiences in the context of Simpsons episodes. This process does not take place in the subconscious; rather, these people are extremely self-aware (super-liminal perhaps?) of the role The Simpsons has played in their lives.4 Beyond mere fandom and allegiance to a particular series, the genius of The Simpsons created in its fans a particular identity and a particular taste in comedy that informed subsequent creative enjoyment and discernment. The Formative Years Thesis presumes that individuals are most susceptible to developing longstanding creative and cultural tastes during a particular gestational period. However, it is once they identify with the specific influence that the effect bears its imprint: they are so enamored with their cherishment that they often cannot appreciate different styles of art antithetical, or even subtly different, from the influence itself. Their appreciation of comedy or art is so idiosyncratically tied up with the influence, they are unable to find deviations from that specificity worthwhile or impressive. Popular music provides illustrative examples. Individuals who grew up loving The Beatles and The Beach Boys, beyond mere enjoyment but to the point of self-identification (“part of who I am, an important part, is that I love this music”), are likely to require the prominence of melody in later choices of music; consequently, a-melodic styles (for example, The Fall) often will not be appealing, not because of poor quality or an inherent listener disinclination, but as a vestigial affectation born from preferences determined during their formative period.

Supplementing the thematic and substantive appeals to its formative-state fans, temporal considerations also participated in their burgeoning fixation, and ultimate reprobation. That the series’ core fanbase hopped on the trolley at a specific, and specifically young, age group is significant in that this demographic was generally free from worldly responsibility and had the luxury of devoting time and energy to the show, a necessity given that The Simpsons possessed features daunting to the non-obsessed: many more characters than a typical live-action TV sitcom, non-obvious visual cues as jokes in addition to dialogue, and subtle references to past material (not just storylines, but little-used character cameos, self-referential jokes, repeating themes). Like any powerful art, the more you gave, the more you got. Animation allowed for more freedom than live-action TV, and The Simpsons were able to pack content into an episode that a first-time or casual viewer may have missed. The guerdon for its fans’ investment was a special bond that placed the identity of the viewer within the context of the show. However, this identity changed. Formative-year fandom subsidized by the halcyon frivolity of youth would eventually give way, for many at least, to the heightened responsibilities of older age and interests that go beyond watching what is essentially a cartoon. Watching every new episode plus up to 10 per week in syndication (high school and college provided ample time and opportunity for Simpsons fans to indulge in their interest, while at the same time allowing them to become fluent in the lexicon and style of The Simpsons of a particular milieu, strengthening the bond) became simply not possible, again, for many at least.5 So as the individual necessarily grew and matured, entering a new stage of life, The Simpsons became a smaller part of the personal experience. This was exacerbated by The Simpsons’ dramatic change in style and content (as we shall see, infra) which further alienated an already distanced fan. The viewer no longer defines him/herself by a television show, and decreased quality is offered as the easiest explanation (I haven’t changed, you’ve changed). This phenomenon is not unique to the animated subject. Musical interest often follows this dark and stormy road through the tunnel of obsessive consumption and down the gravely grade to feeble abstinence. That frequently heard and always soporific argument, “they’ve stopped making good music since 1969” (or 1989 or 1993 or enter the year the speaker graduated from high school), is as frustrating to hear as it is easy to unpack: youthful discovery of a band or a style (“punk rock changed our lives”) leads to fanatical interest before the well of angst-driven interest dries up and is filled instead with other interests and obligations, the listener moves on, musical styles continue to move on without him/her, and the listener has ultimately eschewed most if not all musical pleasures. The mechanism is not much different than the Formative Years Thesis with respect to The Simpsons and is perhaps more common.6

The Emergence of the Absurdly Experimental Comedy

The changing backdrop of The Simpsons’ audience coincided with a gradual but marked shift in the style and type of humor employed on the show. Though there were other significant technical and substantive developments on the show which help support the claim that The Simpsons is as interesting and peerless as ever (Part 2, coming later), the current section deals with the emergence of a specific brand of humor that correlates well to the aging of the audience and helps explain the thinning of the show’s widespread adulation. Though also a charm that can be used to justify the current grandeur of The Simpsons, this change in the nature of joke tenor is better placed here because of its off putting and heightening effect on certain fans.7

From its inception The Simpsons utilized an expansive arsenal of comedic elements to simultaneously create biting yet playful cultural satire. Sarcasm, realism, and surrealism were hallmarks of the show both then and now and throughout. However, at some palaverously vague Abaddon-like tipping point, but clearly over time, the show began to focus less on the reality-based jesting that hitherto was its brioche and I-Can't-Believe-It's-Not-Butter, that is, humor acting as a way to address and lampoon reality, and more on the hilarity of the absurd and the comicality of the bizarre, that is, the joke being akin to a 2nd order differential equation where the x is Homer becoming the mayor of New Springfield following an area code dispute and the y is Homer becoming the crazy mayor of New Springfield following an area code dispute.

The Simpsons got weird as fuck. The show not only put its characters in crazier and zanier situations – one criticism asserting that it had finally become a cartoon – but made the references more obscure and the jokes more abrasive. What once was an homage to The Shining turned into screams of “I feel like I'm in Fitzcarraldo!” An endearing portrait of Homer as a reformable drunk gave way to Krusty “smelling the flowers” and the homeless guy vowing to buy “a suit of drugs.” Even the classic Simpson misdirection was intensified and floridified: “I’m not easily impressed. Wow! A blue car!” became, “This is a crowbar,” accompanied by Moe’s picture of crows sitting down at the “Old Crow,” complete with little stools. Whereas earlier era jokes, such as the famous “Lisa needs braces – Dental Plan” repetition interrupted only by the always classy pencil in the butt crack gag, cast a wide enough net to bait a mainstream audience, recent bits like Homer butchering Mr. Bojangles while begging (“Mr. Bo-jangles, we’re all, bo-jangled, who killed, Bo-jangles?”) were more likely to appeal to the devoted, possibly demented, few.

This creeping shift towards comedic inaccessibility was borne out of, more than anything, necessity. Yes, the humanity of the show’s early years was touching and moving, but how many times can an episode end with Homer and Marge riding into the sunset before staleness sets in and you begin inching towards Growing Pains territory? While adhering to methodical formulae done expertly (hello Golden Girls) may be sufficient for great art, even one that boasts the most subversive spirit found on TV since M.A.S.H., it is not the wisest course for those aspiring to be truly, once-in-a-lifetime great.8 So, The Simpsons went for broke, broke out the Buňuel references, and turned up the crazy on all of its characters (Moe is a suicidal poet-genius, Lenny lives next to a jai-alai court, and even Lisa corrals up a strutting gang of vagabond animals, including a raccoon and a canary, all to the sweet sounds of George Baker Selection’s “Little Green Bag”). The cost of such insanity was leaving behind a hefty portion of former diehards (current squares) to clutch the tattered, faded rags of beautiful memories from a past long gone as they shiver in the barren wasteland that their lives have become, while watching Entourage. Stay warm, friends.

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1 The quality of the show has certainly seen fluctuations over time. The general consensus is that after a season or two of the show coming into its own and finding its groove, The Simpsons reached an impressive golden age unmatched in creative output by any TV show of its or any other time. This two-dimensional xanadu lasted from around ’92-’95 (though some would argue that the downturn began in ’94 after Kogen and Wolodarsky penned their last episode together). Many simply write off the Maxtone-Graham reign as increasingly garbage, and while even I will agree that there were a few lean, sub-par years approaching the millennium, the show rebounded in a big way in 2000 with Season 12 and backed it up the following year in what is perhaps the single greatest, and most experimental, season in the show’s history. The show continued to incorporate bizarre references and joke structures while magnanimously revolutionizing the visual representation of the show. I think it's fair to describe the last few seasons as general quality with a certain amount of hit-or-missness. The early returns from the first two months of this most recent season, however, are somewhat disappointing. I think it’s too early to make definitive conclusions, but I think we can legitimately ask, for the first time in a while, is this the year the ever looming Simpsons decline takes place? It’s probably not a good idea to question your entire thesis in the very first endnote, but here we are.

2 The high end of this range were those still young enough (around 14 years old) to get into what was essentially a cartoon at its inception and stick with it as it grew into something much more involved and much more intelligent than those who still considered it to be just a cartoon would have imagined. The low end were those old enough (around 8 years old at inception) to follow a prime time television show from week to week and season to season and to be able to understand the various pop-cultural references. Essentially though, it’s just my age plus or minus a few years on each side. I can safely say that I do not know a core Simpsons fan whose birthdate falls outside the range. Regarding the professional TV critics who praised the show from the beginning and who clearly fall outside the older end of the range: I do not consider these people to be in the core. These people had their taste in comedy shaped long before The Simpsons were born. There were also likely singing similar praises for The Cosby Show, Cheers, and Friends during their careers. Not evaluating the quality of those shows, but real Simpsons’ heads did not sing the praises of those shows.

This narrow age range of Simpsons followers contrasts sharply with that of the at-one-time contemporary, Seinfeld, whose fan base certainly included the Simpsons-age gang (teenagers through the bulk of the show’s run), and expanded into college students, young professionals (John Stewart recently claimed to Jerry Seinfeld that he knows every episode line by line), older professionals (the peer group of the actors on the show), and even the baby boomers (my parents watched the show almost as often as I did).

3 This seems axiomatic. I guess it’s possible that certain hardcore fans could have arrived at the show later, but they would then not meet the requirement of having grown up with it. Though fans certainly could have caught on at the tail end of Conan’s days and beyond, a glorious time no doubt, they would have missed the first evolution of characters and writing style, as well as the important "I was there from the beginning" of any interest that becomes so involved as to be self-identifying, that is, part of how you identify yourself is through the interest. Also, personal experience tells me that most Simpsons-heads were already watching within the first few years.

4 One of the more unique experiences being a Simpsons fan provides is the oft-repeated conversation where you and your friends each discuss how much The Simpsons has meant in your lives, not just in terms of giving you endless hours of enjoyment and laughs, but in making you the person you are, shaping your sensibilities, telling you which aspects of our government are ridiculous, and emboldening your hatred of aliens, illegal and extraterrestrial. More so than your family, friends, religion, or the state, The Simpsons is perhaps the easiest and most honest vehicle for its fans to analyze the tragedy and fortune of who they are and where they came from.

5 I somehow am able to make this work.

6 I have had the misfortune to hear two different people on two different occasions proclaim that music “stopped being good since Metallica’s ‘… And Justice For All.’” Perhaps more unpleasant was listening to a level headed friend’s earnest rebuttal to the proposition and the ensuing drunken back and forth. I think most people have at least overheard if not participated in that conversation.

7 Truth be told, the features described in Part II as attributes of the current version of the show could easily be placed in Part I as well, as they were likely to have also had an effect on deterring certain viewers, but categories rarely have firm boundaries and are used here for ease and clarity of organization and presentation. As almost always.

8 Could Arrested Development have sustained that level for significantly longer than it did? It’s hard to say, but it seemed they reached for too much too soon up against an audience that wasn’t ready, or wasn’t able, to plunge in. R.I.P.